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2§1| Introduction 
 
In the first few weeks of March 2001 officials from the Taliban’s Ministry for the Prevention of 
Vice and the Promotion of Virtue successfully fulfilled the task of destroying two giant, ancient 
statues of the Buddha in Bamiyan, 90 miles west of Kabul in Afghanistan.  Understandably, a sense 
of disbelief and horror swept the world, not only the West and not only Buddhist countries; horror 
and disbelief which turned inevitably to anger and the demand for justification.  Justification had, 
however, already been given, before the act was carried out.  In the reported words of Mullah 
Mohammad Omar we were told: “Because God is one God and these statues are there to be 
worshipped and that is wrong.  They should be destroyed so that they are not worshipped now or in 
the future.” (McCarthy, 2001) 
 
Omar's religious prescription perfectly embodies a problem which has haunted moral philosophy 
from its inception, that of relativism.  Relativism is supposedly opposed to philosophy for the 
simple reason that philosophy has always sought universal principles on which all men can agree.  
If no man is of the contrary opinion, then it must be true.  Such a principle is still in operation 
today, we need only think of approaches to applied philosophy in general and euthanasia in 
particular.  Whether we wish to justify or argue against euthanasia, two forms of argument are at 
hand: religious or secular.  Secular arguments are preferable to religious ones simply due to the fact 
that they appeal to the largest set of possible reasoners and are based on principles which, it is 
supposed, all men share.  On the other hand, religious arguments take the form: if x is taken to be 
true, then y follows.  However, the subordinate clause is, as it were, all to play for.  The participants 
in the discussion suspend their disbelief on certain fundamental principles which have to be taken 
for granted.  If the argument is in accordance with these fundamental principles, then the statement 
or prescription is true only if x is true and to argue for x (my personal god(s) with all his, her or 
their prescriptions exist(s)) is a far from easy task. 
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Good moral philosophy ought, therefore, to be akin to good science: truth is that on which all 
rational beings can agree no matter what their background, tradition or contingent, cultural beliefs. 
The question should be approached as a rational debate guided by the logical rules of reasoning.  
First, as participants in discourse, we must assume that there exists only one possible answer to the 
question whether or not the statues should be destroyed. The answer is either yes or no, if it is yes-
for-them and no-for-us, then we have not overcome relativism. If there is more than one answer, 
then the question needs to be recast, it may be either badly framed or confused.  Secondly, the 
principles which lead to the correct answer shall be shared and agreed upon, they should be 
modelled as closely as possible on those sciences which yield unambiguous, unitary answers to 
questions.  This will generally entail that all contingent factors – such as culture, identity claims and 
traditions – will have to be bracketed off and pushed to one side.  The question is not dealt with 
from the point of view of a particular identity, but from the view with which all men can agree no 
matter what their origins.  Finally, this answer will be universal since it will be true for everyone in 
all places and at all times rather than just for members of a certain group or individuals who possess 
certain beliefs.1  Universality can subsequently be understood as the view which is free of cultural 
prejudice and superstition based upon principles with which all rational beings can agree. 
 
Does this aspiration to universality resolve the problem?  I certainly do not wish to dismiss the 
worth of the statues as a non-question, or even as a question not properly framed and, as such, I 
must firstly assume that there is a single answer to the problem which can be proven by a process of 
reason acceptable to all participants in the debate.  On the one hand, the reason is offered that the 
destruction of false idols is in accordance with God’s will.2  The reason, though, is dependent on the 
presupposition of certain religious principles and a way of life, or those categories, concepts, values 
and norms which pre-exist the subject, deriving from his role in and his membership of a particular 
society, religion or culture, and which govern the subject’s practical reasoning.  It would seem that 
4Mullah Omar has already committed himself to a relative argument, in the sense that he expects his 
listener to embrace the fundamental presuppositions of his way of thinking, viz. strict, orthodox 
Islam.  Surely, if I can find a universal, secular argument for the preservation of the statues, Omar’s 
prescription will be trumped and negated. 
 
Are universal principles available in the matter at hand?  Why was there this almost universal horror 
at the wanton destruction of these idols?  The reason is not as easy to uncover as may have been 
thought.  Obvious contenders include: the statues are historically important; or nice; or beautiful. 
(Yet, this in itself is far from easy to determine given the differences in the interpretation of the 
historically significant, the beautiful, the nice, from one person to the next.)  I, for one, would not 
like to weigh the universal claim of “Don’t destroy them because they are beautiful” with “It is 
God’s will”.  There must be something more to the argument for it to bite: a substantial principle of 
the significance and worth of cultural artefacts; the importance of restoring and maintaining the 
past.  Yet, if we were to claim some moral principle of restoration, or some principle of the cultural 
significance of ancient artefacts, then we have invoked an if-clause just as contentious as the 
religious one: “If it is the case that cultural artefacts are socially significant, then we should not 
destroy them,” truly demands more justification.   We are guilty of reflecting those values taken to 
be self-evident to oneself which may be ultimately groundless.  Each story is equally contentious 
and, as such, if they are both held to be true, how are we to order the claims to obligation?  There is 
no universal – in the sense of free from a way of thinking and acceptable to all – principle which 
can trump the two contesting claims. 
 
It seems that universal principles, in this case, do not help the situation, or – worse – are just not 
available.  The choice just cannot be rational because the reasons which motivate the action are 
incommensurable, they just cannot be compared, systematized and ordered in any meaningful way.  
Without a move towards mutual comprehension, the two sides of the debate are shouting across a 
5void.  Again, if we are to stick rigorously to the demands of philosophy, we shrug our shoulders and 
push the question under the carpet.  Are we forced to admit that this just is not a philosophical 
matter and what effect will this admission have on the nature of moral philosophy as a whole? 
 
The central claim of any universal ethics is that, when two participants prescribe contradictory rules 
of conduct, then either one or both of them is in error.  Behind this commitment is the putative 
assumption – borrowed from the natural sciences – that there can be but one answer to a moral 
question.  In response to the question whether the Buddha statues should be destroyed, the answer is 
either “yes” or “no”.  Hermeneutics differs from this approach in that the answer will always be 
conditional and cannot be otherwise, so it is possible that it will be “yes, given x” and “no, given y”, 
where x and y represent foundational concepts and values of different ways of life.  However, even 
though the answer may be conditional, especially in our example, the two prescriptions cannot co-
exist due to the restrictions of social and moral space and so tolerance is out of the question.  
Simply put, the statues cannot be destroyed for one group and not for the other, neither can we just 
put a sheet over them and ignore their existence unless we want to see them. 
 
§2| A quick characterisation of hermeneutical thinking 
 
Hermeneutical understanding requires that an agent is capable of distancing him or herself from a 
internal understanding of his or her way of life and adopting an external stance.  Internally, the 
concepts, rules and values of the way of life are unreflective guides to conduct shared by a peer 
group.  The foundational presuppositions of a way of life appear self-evident to the agent because 
they are immediate and ground all other claims.  An example of this in contemporary applied 
philosophy would be the universal appropriation of the principle of sanctity of human life 
notwithstanding the theoretical difficulties in justifying such a principle.  It is assumed to be self-
6evidently true and, hence, grounds much of our moral thinking on more particular subjects such as 
abortion, euthanasia and war.   
 
However, it is also possible for the agent to be an observer who does not himself accept the rules, 
and he would therefore understand the rules and conditions of a community only externally.  Those 
self-evident principles move from transparency to opacity; they come to light.  The external point of 
view is that of the social scientist or cultural critic: the horror which people of our culture express in 
the face of killing and the general acceptance that other moral principles can be trumped when life 
is at stake (one need only think of forgiveness granted through sympathy to the mother who steals 
in order to feed her starving child) both serve to reveal the centrality of the sanctity of life principle 
within our culture and such phenomena can only be intelligible if it is true that, for an agent of such 
and such a way of life, human life is valued as a central moral concern. 
 
The external position can be either extreme or moderate.  An extremely external observer merely 
records the regularities exhibited by agents within this particular way of life.  Thus, the observer is 
able to fairly successfully predict which responses to certain situations will be greeted with 
admiration, which with punishment and which with acceptance on the basis of probability.  For 
example, a red light is a sign that people will stop their cars.  However, such an observer may be 
able to explain the actions (the behaviour most likely to occur near a red light is stopping of cars), 
but he is unable to comprehend the truth of the obligation. (Hart, 1994, 89-90)  He or she perceives 
agents as objects obeying certain statistical laws: a red traffic light generates ninety percent 
probability of an agent stopping.  For such an observer, a red light is a sign that people will stop in 
the same sense that clouds are a sign that it will rain. 
 
However, such a point of view cannot discriminate between coercion and rule following.  In the 
case of a bank robbery, the extremely external observer would say that there is a ninety percent 
7probability that the teller will hand over the money.  It would be to miscomprehend the situation to 
describe this as a rule of conduct.  The teller may be obliged to hand over the money, but it would 
be wrong to say he has an obligation to do so.  Moral behaviour is not adequately characterized 
from this extremely external point of view, rather the agent is motivated by an internal rather than 
an external factor: the belief that obeying the law is the right thing to do.  There is a difference 
between “to feel obliged” and “to be obliged”; the former is a psychological endorsement of an 
objective law, whereas the second is a recognition of the consequences of obeying or disobeying a 
law.  It is only in the former case that an observer can describe a duty or an obligation.  The 
extremely external point of view can only describe probabilities and regularities. 
 
A more moderate externality will hold that the red light is a reason for the people to stop in the 
same way that clouds are a reason to carry an umbrella.  It is to describe the appropriate behaviour 
in a certain situation given the agent’s specific way of life.  This is to describe the behaviour of 
agents as if from the internal point of view on rules or, to put it another way, as moral beings.  The 
observer would feel the obligation because he is aware that the social pressure of admiration, 
respect or condemnation are not just consequential considerations; that is, he recognizes the 
appropriate behaviour in a certain situation is judged by knowing what is expected of the agent by 
his community.  It is possible for the moderately external observer to say, given this way of life it is 
appropriate to act in such and such a manner.  It is to understand the obligation without necessarily 
endorsing it.  Whereas an extremely external observer will treat agents as ruled by descriptive laws, 
the moderate external observer will treat them as ruled by prescriptive laws. 
 
Hermeneutical understanding takes this moderately external form; in reflecting on his way of life, 
the observer, in a sense, puts himself both inside and outside of it.  The observer asks himself, “If I 
were a member of this group, what would my obligation be?”.  Yet, because he is not taking the 
internal point of view, the obligation is not immediately binding and is open to reflective 
8questioning: he can ask himself the reciprocal question, what does this obligation reveal about the 
conditions which make this perception of moral situations possible?  In reflecting on his own 
reasons for action, the observer is able to disclose the conditions that generate his response (that is, 
to reveal his way of life).  It is to suspend the immediately binding nature of his social existence and 
to embrace the assumption that moral knowledge and motivations are, in some sense, always 
governed by an if-clause or way of life.  If I ask myself why I can forgive the mother who steals to 
feed her child, why I find the practice of ritual human sacrifice abhorrent and why I am troubled by 
seemingly logical assertions of the utilitarian “many lives must outweigh the few”, it is because the 
moral value of human life grounds and systematizes all my moral judgements and evaluations.  And 
such grounding concepts and values are intimately bound to both my historical and geographical 
origin (and would be fully comprehended by the narration of an historical tradition with which I 
identify myself).  In other words, human artefacts cannot be divorced from their situation and 
context.  The hermeneutic circle of interpretation, in which one’s moral experience (as a cultural 
phenomenon) is interrogated in order to reveal those underlying principles which make it possible, 
serves to bring to light hidden and unconscious conditions of moral knowledge.3  Through an 
interpretation of the way in which we experience the world, we can reveal those categories and 
concepts which inform our judgements.  Hermeneutics is the interpretative method which discloses 
those principles which determine the moral judgements of the agent. 
 
Given the broad flavour of the above illustration of hermeneutics as a theory of, ostensibly, cultural 
and social interpretation, it would be worthwhile to narrow the concern of the present argument to 
the matter at hand, that is the rational resolution of inter-cultural conflicts.  There are three essential 
features of basic hermeneutic theory which bear upon this problem: one, it is form of idealism; two, 
categories of understanding are culturally and historically determined; and, three, evaluative 
statements play a role in rational discourse.  
 
9§2.1| Idealism 
 
 
Hermeneutics, in the first instance, is a form of minimal idealism which is to merely say that it 
takes seriously the Copernican revolution introduced into philosophy by Kant: an object of 
knowledge must be experienced via the employment of categories which belong to the subject's 
own mode of knowing rather than the object itself. (Kant, 1993, Preface)  Any attempt to surmount 
these categories which determine possible objects of knowledge are doomed to failure since the 
subject's experience must be structured by them.  For the human being to be a knower, he has to 
meet certain a priori conditions (not derived from experience but derived from the subject himself) 
which make experience possible.4  As such, reality is always filtered through such conditions and 
can never be grasped in-itself: objects are always for-us as rational beings. 
 
Truth, then, is not to be found in the correspondence of the subject’s representation with a state of 
affairs, rather true statements are those which are consistent with the proper use of the categories 
when applied to intuitions given to the subject.  Therefore, one can say an object is empirically real 
when it corresponds to the human point of view.  Transcendentally (that is, independent of human 
thought) objects do not exist, their constitution depends on a subject actively structuring their form.  
Thus, for Kant, causality is objective from the human point of view (it belongs to us all), but 
subjective from a transcendental standpoint.  Objects of cognition are, then, transcendentally ideal 
(cannot be accorded reality independently of the structure of experience) but also empirically real 
(that is, they are constituted by the structure of experience). 
 
The idealism implicit in hermeneutical theory explains why our initial characterisation was in terms 
of rule-following and obligations: knowledge is not the correspondence of a representation with a 
state of affairs, but the consistent and correct application of those principles and concepts which 
10 
make experience possible for the subject.  So, I am right to be appalled by ritual human sacrifice 
because the value of human life prescribes the correct response to the object of evaluation.  
However, Kant kept a robust sense of objectivity because he held that the ideas, categories and 
concepts of reason were universal, as were the regulations.  Any derivation from these would result 
in poor reasoning and insubstantial claims.  Kant’s aim was simple and it was the overriding 
concern of the Enlightenment: to rid reason of its obstructions whether they be superstition, 
prejudice or  the irrational. (Kant, 1996)   
 
§2.2| Cultural basis for moral categories of understanding 
 
Secondly, and in contradiction of Kant, the categories which determine our moral ways of knowing 
are not universal but culturally acquired or given.  They do not belong to the subject as rational 
knower, but as member of a particular historical group.  This, in fact, may not be the whole truth, 
there may be universal structures of human experience: Kant’s space and time, Heidegger’s 
temporality or, even, a materialist naturalism, but none of these will be able to rise to the level of 
everyday knowledge and understanding without incorporating ways of thinking, linguistic baggage 
and socially relative concepts.  It may be possible to universally agree that respect is a good, but it 
depends on our ability to internally interpret a way of life to say whether such and such an action is 
an expression of respect.  Respect, like sympathy, is a morally praiseworthy attitude but unless we 
know how or when to be respectful, we are incapable of fulfilling such obligations.  Substantial 
obligations which determine how and in which situations these are to be expressed can only be 
derived from a way of life with its practices and mores, not from universal principles. 
 
§2.3| The rationality of evaluative statements 
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Finally, hermeneutics recognizes the rationality of evaluative claims.  Evaluative statements – such 
as expressions of horror and sympathy – are a way in which the human subject participates in the 
world.  In many respects, primitive evaluation (“killing disgusts me”) grounds more reified ways of 
knowing (“abortion is immoral”) and evaluative statements are at least minimally rational.  One 
need only think here of Heidegger’s (1962) persistent early consideration of concern, solicitude and 
care as ways of knowing; or, even, Sartre’s (1991) exposition of shame.5  Such knowing reveals the 
way in which we comprehend the world: horror and sympathy are an evaluative response to 
situations and these responses, when interrogated (via the reflective process of the hermeneutic 
circle), reveal certain principles which inform the agent’s moral experience.   
 
It may be objected that evaluative statements are not true or false but either appropriate or 
inappropriate.  However, it is equally the case that we chastise and condemn inappropriate 
evaluative statements and this chastisement rests upon the intuition that the agent in question has 
misunderstood the situation in hand; whether such an error is due to the concepts he or she brings to 
bear on the problem or the incorrect application of the rules of reason.  That his or her reaction is 
inappropriate is due to his or her understanding of the world and we would attempt to bring that 
very understanding into line with ours (even if we would perhaps be less rigorous with the child 
incapable of experiencing Picasso’s genius than in the case when she holds that two plus two are 
five).  We would try and make them see the situation in such a way that his or her evaluation is 
appropriate.  Evaluative statements reveal the agent’s fundamental way of understanding the world 
and, as such, have as much to do with truth as do the concepts which make possible our experience 
of the world.6 
 
§3| The tendency to relativism and subjectivism 
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It is the second feature of hermeneutic theory which underlies its implicit tendency to relativism; 
that is, it seems impossible to escape relativism if the theory itself accepts contingent, cultural 
factors in the subjective constitution of experience.  And from relativism, we are but one easy step 
to subjectivism as concerns inter-cultural conflict.  For me, as member of a specific group, the 
statement “abortion is wrong” is rational (whether it be true or not) because it can stand in logical 
relation to other statements; “killing is wrong”, “the taking of life is killing”, “an embryo is (not) a 
life” and so on, such that an argument can be had between my peers and myself.  Yet, all this is 
possible because we share the same cultural a priori structure of experience grounded in the utmost 
significance and value of human life.  And that is beyond reproach for us.  Yet, when I come into 
contact with an alien culture which practices ritual human sacrifice, or prizes the collective over 
individuals, or is prepared to risk death for glory, and so on, then this statement is seemingly 
revealed to be nothing more than a contingent cultural prejudice or ungrounded commitment in 
order to make sense of moral experience which is not universally shared.  And it could have been 
different. 
 
So, how can we respond to a conflict between prescriptions originating from different (and not the 
same) ways of life?  First, we may state that difference is wonderful and become tolerant (for them 
it is wrong, yet for us it is right).  Certain mores and practices can be tolerated within the moral 
space of society: dietary requirements, dress codes, the upbringing of children and education.  Yet, 
certain other issues are not culturally bound in the same way: the problem of human sacrifice, the 
problem of female circumcision and, of course, whether we should or should not blow Buddha up.  
It is not, in these cases, a matter of simply letting-be because there is not always enough social 
space for the practices or actions to exist side-by-side.  Second, we may decide that ours is the 
correct world-view, but without rational argument we are violating the very principles of 
hermeneutics.  When the bank teller does not wish to give into my demand for some cash because 
he does not agree that mine is a worthwhile reason for him even if he recognizes that it is for me (“I 
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need the money to make me happy”), then I violate his will by showing him my gun.  I resort to 
violence and seemingly assert that might is right since I force him to do something against his own 
better judgement.  My action is nothing more than the expression of attitudes akin to stating that 
“You may not like cheese, but I do and my will is mightier than yours, so you are wrong.”  The 
grounding principles of our moral experience must also be justified in order for rational agreement 
to be reached.  The problem is that if we hold that the categories of understanding are cultural, truth 
amounts to, at best, a truth for us and conflict resolution becomes nothing more than a game of 
power between groups and individuals. 
 
 
Hermeneutics allows us to interrogate a way of life from the inside, to grasp in an imaginative leap 
how others might see the world and even come to a better understanding of how the observer 
himself structures his own experience, but the very affirmation of cultural categories which 
determine knowledge coupled with the recognition of the rationality of evaluative statements means 
that hermeneutics implicitly tends to relativism and, although in some cases this is of no 
importance, it is crucial in others.  It matters when the possible answers to a moral question cannot 
exist harmoniously side-by-side; that is, when the answers come into conflict.  For this reason, we 
either reject hermeneutics or we offer an account whereby the claim to universality can be upheld 
and be made consistent with a hermeneutical approach.  Otherwise, the theory's normative 
credentials are dead in the water.7 
 
§4| Conflict and resolution 
 
Let us return to the problem in hand: should the statues  have been destroyed?  Let us also assume 
that all participants in the dialogue are sincere.  Both can build, I believe, rational arguments: the 
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blasphemous nature of the statues is consistent with passages and interpretations of the Koran and 
certain grounding moral principles held by orthodox Muslims.  Similarly, the defence of statues is, I 
believe, best mounted from a secular, liberal rationality grounded in the tolerance and agnosticism 
of the modern subject.  In dialogue, these foundations are brought to the fore and a prescription 
needs to be made which is acceptable and rational to both participants.  The aim is to find a 
resolution that is consistent with the three features of hermeneutics (otherwise there is no need to 
consider this approach) and that either rules out one of the prescriptions as invalid or offers a new 
prescription acceptable to all parties. 
 
There are, it intuitively seems, several rival models of resolution consistent with the central tenets 
of hermeneutics (in order that it may keep its normative credentials in place): (4.1) an 
Enlightenment commitment to a philosophy of history and progress; (4.2) a universal fundamental 
structure of human moral experience that will yield a cosmopolitan point of view; (4.3) political 
liberalism and the separation of ethical and political principles; and, finally, (4.4) the recognition of 
reasonable limitations (generated by the nature of hermeneutics itself) on sincere participants in 
dialogue. 
 
§4.1| The philosophy of history  
 
Conflicts arise when ways of life offer contradictory answers to the same problem and will 
normally be resolved when one of them demonstrates it is better.  A way of life, for example, whose 
moral culture grounded in animism and prescribes practices such as ritual sacrifice is, intuitively, 
less advanced and less sophisticated, that is more primitive and barbaric, than our own.  However, 
in order to be consistent with the outlined features of hermeneutics, being “better” cannot refer to 
how accurately it corresponds to an external, independent of subjects, state of affairs. The 
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Enlightenment idea of progress assumes that time flows in one direction and there is a simple 
historical imperative that rules ways of life: a way of life is more advanced if the tradition is older 
than its rival.  Time is the process which replaces superstition with science; as medicine improves 
with the ages, so too do moral concepts.  Such a position is grounded in several contentious 
assumptions which, for economic reasons, I shall do no more than list here.  One, progress occurs 
when internal or external inconsistencies are revealed by novel moral problems.  Two, a subject can 
assert that his present way of life is better than earlier one simply because history sorts the wheat 
from the chaff, although any attempt to comprehend the process of history is beyond his capacity.8 
 
So, when ways of life “a” and “b” conflict over a matter, it must be possible to resolve the conflict 
due to the emergence of a new way of life “c”.  (“C” it might be added can be the negation of either 
“a” or “b”, but a concession has to made to understanding – to avoid violence – and, for that very 
fact, it must involve some redefinition of the successful way of life.)  That position “c” is offered as 
a resolution explicable and acceptable to both “a” and “b”, implies that it is a better way of life 
because it explains all that “a” and “b” used to explain, but can also resolve the conflict in 
acceptable terms which accord with the previous beliefs of both “a” and “b”.  The perspectives of 
“a” and “b” were unable to disclose the “truth” because their categories of understanding corrupted 
their perception of the matter in hand.  The better perspective “c” was able to reveal the nature of 
the conflict in a way which accorded with both “a” and “b”, thus simultaneously overcoming and 
preserving their accounts of the matter.  “C” is better because of consistency (it is more consistent 
with other beliefs) and scope (it is better able to make sense of other phenomena).  Categories 
which corrupt understanding are purged in favour of categories which are more consistent with 
other ways of thinking (science replaces superstition). 
 
There are three principal problems with this solution.  One, how is one to justify the claim of 
progress in the moral sphere?  Empirically we might point to natural or medical science, but to 
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apply this to political and moral systems is far from convincing (we cannot, without reservation, 
state that a duty based morality is better than a virtue based one).  Two, from whose viewpoint is 
history to be structured and progress measured?  If we respond from the most advanced, then there 
already exist criteria by which we can choose one way of life over another that are independent of 
the human perspective since the more advanced is more advanced because it has truer or better 
moral concepts.  Three, and most damagingly, if history resolves conflicts, then this commits the 
subject to quietism: if our tradition or another tradition appears unjust, it may always be defended as 
a necessary step forward.  Thus, the blowing up of the Buddhas was a “good” because it has lead to 
a re-evaluation of central moral concepts even though these re-evaluated concepts will tell us it was 
“wrong” to blow the statues up.  This negates the thinking subject’s role in rationally interrogating, 
rejecting and ordering ways of life: he must wait for history to decide and concede the rational right 
to reflection and protest. If this is the case, then hermeneutics may be a way to understand more 
primitive ways of thinking but it is unable to resolve conflicts, that remains the prerogative of 
history.  In other words, if a philosophy of progress is to be the normative basis for hermeneutical 
theory, then it is just not normative at all since the subject is unable to say “we ought to change 
this”.   
 
With the example in hand (putting aside the nature of the Taliban themselves), the choice is 
between liberalism and Islam and if we side with the former we are assuming that the history of 
Islam will eventually become a new liberalism.  Such a claim is empirically contentious, 
patronizing and will result in the violation of wills which are seen as more primitive without a firm 
grounding. 
 
§4.2| Cosmopolitanism 
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One can hold on to the features of hermeneutics (culturally contingent, rational moral idealism) and 
yet still find space for a universal approach: cultures may differ in detail, but at some, deep level 
there are universal values or principles (Kantianism) or desires and needs (rational naturalism, 
utilitarianism), that all rational or human beings share (the community of human beings).  By 
identifying those values or interests we all share, we can come to agreement on principles of action.  
So, we all recognize the value of respecting others or the need for self-preservation and avoidance 
of harm and these points of shared interest can be used to build consensual prescriptions between 
participants. 
 
The universality of such principles as “Do right” or “Be good”, however, amounts to vacuity.9  The 
choice in moral discourse is between formal, empty universals such as “respect others” or 
“sympathize with those who suffer,” or substantial, but relative statements which may be wholly 
contradictory.  For example, two cultures will probably agree that respect is a good, but whereas 
one holds respect can only be granted by monogamy, the other may see polygamy as the only 
proper expression of respect.  Even if it is the case that all men ought to be good, the substantial 
content of goodness is dependent on a shared moral fabric.  Within a community, there are set rules, 
responses and desires which derive from the moral fabric and make moral experience possible.  
With the example in hand, it is difficult to see what shared, substantial value could resolve the 
question of the statues” existence. 
 
§4.3| Political liberalism 
 
Certain ethical matters may well be irresolvable due to either the limitations of practical reason or, 
more strongly, due to the inherent partiality of moral judgement given the combination of the 
idealistic and cultural features of the hermeneutical position.  So, we may want to recognize the 
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question as ethical, but realize there will be no resolution without coercion.  However, if reasons 
had been offered, then violence and coercion are seemingly the last resort since the goal of reasons 
are to engage and not negate the will.  If the only way to offer an ethical resolution is to affirm one 
or other participant as true and certain and to negate his opponent, then we should consider it a 
practical problem of avoiding violence within a space and hence a political problem.  Political 
liberalism affirms the distinction between comprehensive and political values such that the latter are 
limited in scope (applying to only basic questions of justice), are independent of any comprehensive 
doctrine and are justified with reference to a shared public culture.  Political liberalism, like the 
cosmopolitan approach, seeks to identify a shared set of values with which the participants can 
agree.  Unlike the cosmopolitan approach, it assumes that these values will be different in kind from 
ethical values. (Rawls, 1999)  So, I would recognize the earnest application of Muslim principles in 
the prescription of the destruction of the idols, but since such principles can only be derived from a 
comprehensively religious system, they are the wrong kind of reasons to justify a policy or action.  
And vice versa: the worth of the idols to me is derived from certain secular, liberal metaphysical 
presuppositions concerning equality and respect. 
 
So, in this case, we must identify firstly a basic issue of justice that is at the bottom of the 
disagreement between those who would destroy the statues and those who oppose their destruction.  
Let us allow the advocate of political liberalism an unfair head start and assume that the conflict 
concerns the rights of freedom of conscience and free expression of belief.  Should a society 
prohibit certain religions from freedom of expression?  The answer must surely be no, for the 
simple reason that it may frustrate the aims and projects of certain individuals and, hence, not 
respect the equality of individuals. 
 
It is clear, however, that political liberalism of this sort is ill suited to resolving the conflict since 
there exists no mutual public reason from which to derive principles that are equally applicable.  
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The resolution requires a shared, homogeneous political tradition that is just not available here.  For 
political liberalism to work, we must be able to identify values which will be able to supply the 
foundations for an overlapping consensus (here, the central one is of persons as free and equal 
members of a society), but between cultures such an idea may not be applicable.   
 
Critics of this simplistic rebuttal of the politically liberal agenda may wish to remonstrate that a 
proper interpretation of Muslim principles may well be consistent with an idea of persons as free 
and equal citizens and so, in the same way a comprehensive utilitarian, Kantian, Christian and 
humanistic atheist can politically agree, so too can a Muslim.  Although I do agree with such a 
postulation, it is not enough to salvage political liberalism.  There is, firstly, the motivationary 
problem: as a Muslim, I am committed to obeying the word of God and destroying false idols, but 
as a citizen, I am committed to the respectful tolerance of religious expression.  It would be hard to 
comprehend why the second motivation is more powerful or would take priority over the former 
one.  And such a privilege is, of course, only intelligible to a person who is already committed to a 
liberal form of life that not only recognizes the rights of equality and liberty but also the good of the 
society which embodies these rights.10  That is, someone who is a product of a liberal way of life 
and, hence, we seem to return to the arbitrary affirmation of foundational values and the coercion of 
individuals who do not share such values.  The very distinction between political and 
comprehensive is a reflection of our way of life (secular modernity) that an Orthodox Muslim may 
not accept. 
 
§4.4| Hermeneutics and mature traditions 
As participants in the dialogue, there is an undecided possibility before us: we shall either agree to 
destroy the statues or we shall agree to not destroy the statues.  If we do not agree and an action 
(including defending the statues from destruction) is taken, then the will of (at least) one of the 
participants has been coerced, overridden or violated.  In entering a dialogue, in offering reasons, 
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the agent is affirming his or her rationality and, as such, must be implicitly committed to the worth 
of his or her reason.  Violence and the use of might will, then, be an instance of either the refusal of 
the Other to accept certain reasons which the agent is loathe to concede, or the coercion and 
violation of the will of other participants.  Sincere participants in dialogue will see the use of might 
and violence as the very failure of dialogue and as the absolute last resort. 
 
The first objection is obvious and powerful, very persuasive and simple: fundamentalists (of all ilk), 
since they are convinced of the absolute truth of their metaphysical positions, will not feel the need 
to offer reasons or enter into dialogue.  They have their reasons and they are in the right.  Anyone 
who is unable to accept the reasons is in error and, therefore, should not be heeded.  We ought, 
though, to be careful to separate two positions here: one, the agent who offers no reason for his or 
her actions; and, two, the agent who offers reasons which are directed to an exclusive subset of 
specific human beings and not to all human beings.  The former is, surely, an absurd 
characterisation of any action.  In action, as in speech, a human being is implicitly committed to 
intelligibility and a rational enterprise (the end must always be a “good” for him or her in a very 
minimal sense), otherwise actions are mere events and cannot be evaluated at all.  The destruction 
of the idols by human hand is different in kind from the tragic destruction of Giotto's Assisi frescoes 
by an earthquake.  Action is, by virtue of being action, already rational. 
 
The significant distinction is between those agents who have an exclusive as opposed to an 
inclusive view of public reason (that is the size of the members of the set of possible participants).  
Imagine it as an inclusive versus an exclusive debating club: in the former anyone can sit at the 
table, in the latter only members of the club are invited.  The exclusive view of public reason 
assumes that only a subset of human beings are rationally disposed to receive the right kind of 
reasons (or are, one should say, rational “in the right way”).  The fundamentalist (as the name 
suggests) is an agent who will not engage with those who do not share the comprehensive 
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fundamentals of his or her specific way of life.  Might, then, is rightly used against those who do 
not agree with the basic tenets of this way of life since they are in error and cannot be rational. 
 
Yet, we might want to assert that, even if the fundamentalist offers his or her reasons to a subset of 
possible participants alone, there are already normative requirements in play.  We might want to say, 
for example, that the very practice of reason-giving will lead to an immediate distinction between 
egoistic and objective reasons.  No one is going to accept the justification of an action which is 
formally in the interests of one person at the expense of the interests of the acting agent (all things 
being equal).  That is just not the sort of creatures we are.  However, we would be mistaken if we 
were to assert this.  It is not impossible to imagine that in Ancient Egypt and Asia such egoistic 
reasons were commonplace and part of public reason: “we need to build the pyramid for the glory 
of my afterlife”.  In such a way of life, the reasons offered would have a very limited set of possible 
participants (perhaps, at times, only the king and his executive).  Yet if these reasons were 
applicable but to one person, then they would not be reasons properly speaking.  Reasons must be 
“objective” and appeal to a standard of rightness independent of the will of an individual agent and 
so, for a reason to be properly termed a reason, it requires a recognition of its “rightness” by, at 
least, one peer.  A reason differs from a want in that the motivation of my action is a good 
independent of the fact it is I who want it.11 You, too, can see it as a good.  And it is this feature of 
reasons that distinguish them from preferences and arbitrary expressions of will (mere events).12  
And once that starts, then equality has a foothold.  For once I am making an appeal to the subject-
independent nature of my reason, I implicitly commit myself to the claim that there are other who 
can comprehend its rationality.  Once I admit that there is at least one other rational agent, I begin to 
divide the world into those that have rationality and those that do not.   
 
The distinction between exclusive and inclusive reasons coincides neatly with the distinction 
between the internal and moderately external stances on a way of life.  Internally to a way of life, 
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prescriptions are to be justified with reference to a shared moral fabric of beliefs and concepts 
between members of that way of life.  Moral problems can be rationally resolved in such a way.  
But when participants are from cultures with no shared moral fabric, then a different stance is 
required; that is, an external one.  In order to come to an agreement, all participants must divorce 
themselves from the immediately binding nature of their ways of life and view them as “possible” 
understandings rather than absolute understandings of the matter in hand (if they sincerely want to 
avoid violence and the violation of wills).  The commitment to inclusive reason is a commitment to 
the hermeneutical approach and formal, rational equality between participants in the dialogue.  
Some agents from specific traditions will be unable to take such a stance, but if this is so then they 
cannot be participants in dialogue since they cannot be sincere and treat all participants as equals.  
Therefore, we can distinguish those traditions which are able – for the duration of dialogue – take 
an external stance and use inclusive reason and those that cannot.  Only the former are appropriate 
for the rational inter-cultural resolution of conflicts.  The Enlightenment idea of progress was 
unitary and all encompassing, but here is a more humble view of progress: traditions are immature 
if they deny the principle of equality between reasoners (their members are only capable of 
exclusive reason and the internal stance) and traditions are mature when reasons are offered to 
justify the course of action inclusively to all human beings (their members are committed to 
inclusive reason and are capable of the external stance towards their own ways of life).13  A mature 
tradition's  response to inter-cultural conflict is to be already engaged in hermeneutical reasoning 
and such reasoning – for the duration of the conflict – is just not consistent with absolutist claims.  
In offering inclusive reasons, the agent is aware that he (or she) is involved in a different type of 
reasoning than if he were merely justifying the prescription to his cultural peers. 
 
Islam is a mature tradition.  It is, after all, a religion that seeks to convert non-believers into 
believers using reason or the word of God.  It does not seek to forcibly convert agents under the 
threat of violence since such conversions would be worthless to the will of God.  Hence, it must 
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intrinsically appeal to both believers and non-believers.  Also, Omar (the representative of a group) 
has already offered a reason, quoted above, and the reason was not just for the ears of his peers, but 
delivered via the international media.  Hence, his proffered reason is, at the very least, a statement 
of intent and a marker of those he would converse with and those he would not.  As Omar states, the 
statues “should be destroyed so that they are not worshipped now or in the future.”  By stating 
normative reasons, Omar has metaphorically sat himself at the dialogical table.  What does sitting at 
the inclusive table (as opposed to the exclusive one) require? 
 
A quick review of the argument so far may well reveal a way forward.  In offering reasons, I am 
implicitly asserting that my reason for doing something is not just an arbitrary expression of will 
and this assertion requires the recognition of, at least, one other agent.  Therefore, I must recognize 
at least one other person as a participant in my dialogue and a possible endorser of my reason.  
From the idea of progress we can now separate science from superstition and divide traditions into 
mature and immature.  An immature tradition can decide internal ethical problems within itself, yet 
is unable to engage with other traditions since it does not recognize Others as possible participants 
in dialogue.  The cosmopolitan approach assumed that agreement between particular individuals 
could be made on the basis of formal, universal principles, but these principles were unable to 
determine substantial resolutions to conflicts.  Political liberalism separated reasons into 
comprehensive and political.  Reasonable participants are those who have access to and are 
motivated by the sorts of reasons which are found in a shared public reason and can, therefore, 
generate principles which are acceptable to all and likely to form a stable consensus.  Political 
liberalism has shown that certain conflicts are different in kind and political ones demand different 
kinds of reasons.  However, political values, too, require a shared way of life between participants 
in order to generate a substantially efficacious agreement and in order to outweigh comprehensive 
motivations of an agent.   
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The distinction I now wish to offer is between reasons from a mature tradition and those from an 
immature one.  The reasons from a mature tradition attempt to engage with the Other in order to 
convince him or her of the truth of the participant's position.  The idea of mature traditions offers us 
a new alternative: a person is reasonable if he or she is a member of a mature tradition, that is 
recognizes that his or her reasons are to be offered inclusively to all reasoners.  Thus, reasonable 
reasons are those which can possibly be endorsed by all participants in the dialogue.  Unreasonable 
reasons are those which are applicable to a specific subset and are not expected to be endorsed by 
Others.  Notice that this distinction is different from the comprehensive versus the political because 
comprehensive reasons are possibly reasonable: the dictates of Islam, since they are a rational 
theology, are possibly endorsible as are the dictates of a liberal tradition.  Purely egoistic reasons are 
not.  The reasons offered, then, if accepted, motivate because they are the right kind.14 
 
What does sitting oneself at the dialogical table involve?  One, it is the commitment that our 
reasons are available, intelligible and possibly endorsible by others.  Two, it is the reciprocal respect 
that the participant in the dialogue sincerely believes the same.  We have two initial norms: sincerity 
and respect.  The aim of the dialogue is rational resolution between equals and so I recognize a 
violent solution as failure.  In what way can I best respect other participants and also resolve the 
dialogue peaceably?  It seems that to sit down at the inclusive table is to implicitly commit oneself 
to an hermeneutical process: in order to show that my reasons ought to be rationally preferred to 
your own, I must first understand your reasons as you yourself understand them and this is to begin 
the hermeneutical circle for myself, and so I find myself in a distancing from my own way of life 
and its central convictions.15  But, if a mature tradition is committed to an inclusive idea of reason, 
and this commitment – in times of conflict – leads to a hermeneutic appraisal, then such a 
participant must, for the dialogue to be a success, endorse the three features of hermeneutics (at 
least while he or she sits at the table or is engaged in dialogue).  The hermeneutic process involves 
putting our immediate embedded self into question and the substitution of truth claims by 
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interpretative claims; I see the world thus and so only if I hold x to be the case.  And that means a 
mature tradition is able to simultaneously holds its convictions to be absolutely true internally, but 
to recognize also an inclusive use of reason that requires a suspension of these beliefs for the 
purpose of rationality itself. 
 
§5| The resolution of the conflict 
 
What then might a resolution be in our case?  Both participants in the dialogue, if mature, will 
recognize that there positions are ruled by incommensurable provisos or if-clauses that cannot be 
argued away unless either participant can be shown to be either internally inconsistent or suffering 
from ideological bias.16  So, is the only solution the use of violence and might?  Both participants 
will see that as a failure of rationality itself and so one possible compromise may well be a 
hesitation of all actions.  The destruction of the idols is irredeemable whereas their continued 
presence can be ignored or corrected at a later date.  The result of the dialogue that shows that no 
resolution acceptable to both parties is possible must commit the participants to inaction.  But, note, 
that this is not the case of saying the statues have a right to exist.  The view of Omar and his 
followers has been respectfully heeded and remains a possibility, but the rational process is still 
ongoing.  If the statues were destroyed without the agreement of all participants, violence would 
have destroyed the rational process.  Similarly, if the statues were to be determined a World 
Heritage Site or a military defence were to be put in place, violence will have destroyed the rational 
process.  When resolution has not been reached, hermeneutics – given its commitment to the 
idealism of moral positions (and this is a position which the participants at the time of dialogue 
endorse) – dictates that the rational process ought to continue, otherwise we return to might. 
 
It is a shame that this issue is now purely academic. 
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1
 For a good characterisation of this tradition and some telling criticisms, see Isaiah Berlin, “The 
Divorce between the Sciences and the Humanities,” in Against the Current: Essays in the History of 
Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: Pimlico, 1997), 80-110. 
2
 I shall assume that Omar's words and intentions are sincere and consistent.  There are reasons to 
doubt this: “A recent rebellion in Bamiyan, whose people are Shia Muslims [not Sunni, like the 
Taliban] from the Hazara tribe [not Pashtoon], was viciously put down, reportedly with brutal 
massacres.  The demolition of the Buddhas has unequivocally demonstrated the militia’s authority.”  
(Rory McCarthy, “Taliban order all statues destroyed,” The Guardian Newspaper, February 27, 
2001.)  One of the advantages of hermeneutics is to separate sincerely held beliefs from ideological 
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statements.  However, the argument would be uninteresting if we could just dismiss all those who 
do not agree with our views as either insincere or in error, and I believe the argument offered by 
Omar could be sincerely and consistently held by any member of the Abrahamic religions (and 
possibly others).  
3
 For a good discussion of the different presentations of this hermeneutical circle, see Paul Ricoeur, 
“The Task of Hermeneutics”, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. by John 
Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 43-62 and also Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), ¶7. 
4
 Alfred Ewing lists four ways in which Kant uses the term a priori: logical necessity; not derivable 
form experience; what is presupposed in all our experience; and what is contributed by the subject.  
The usage of a priori here is consistent with the last two. See A Short Commentary on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason (London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 28-30. 
5
 Of course, Sartre is not a hermeneutic thinker because he holds on to Husserl’s absolute 
transparency of consciousness: it is free and spontaneous.  Any cultural influence is bad faith. 
6
 There are three alternatives ways of dealing with this: if assertoric (A) and evaluative (E) 
statements are both instances of truth making statements, then (1) A are brought down to the level 
of E = nihilism; (2) E are levelled up to A (for example, Martin Heidegger's continued affirmation 
of poesis and praxis as ways of knowing in “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic 
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993); (3) a hierarchy still exists in which A 
are above E since the truth they hold is both universal and transparent, but a recognition that E are 
also truth bearing statements, if somewhat less strong (analytic irrealism). I do not explicitly 
endorse any of these alternatives in this paper.  For a useful discussion of this, see Nicholas Smith, 
Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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7
 The challenge that hermeneutics is a useful sociological method, but ultimately of no normative 
significance is most eloquently made by Jürgen Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests, 
trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
8
 This characterizes the Hegelian narrative of spirit, see G.eorg Hegel, The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Arnold Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Martin Heidegger's  enigmatic 
calls for us to listen to Being in “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, ed. 
David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993); and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s more concrete faith in 
the fusion of horizons in Truth and Method, 2nd edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
Marshall (London: Sheed & Ward, 1989).  Hegel believes that subjects at the end of history will be 
able to comprehend such a process. 
9
 This is G.eorg Hegel’s continued criticism of Kantian moral philosophy, see “On the Scientific 
Ways of Treating Natural Law, on its Place in Practical Philosophy, and its Relation to the Positive 
Sciences of Right,” trans. Hugh Nisbet, in Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 102-180. I have discussed the rationalist approach to cosmopolitanism at length and so 
give it a rather short shrift here, see David Rose, “Imagination and Reason: An Ethics of 
Interpretation for a Cosmopolitan Age”, in Cosmopolitics and the Emergence of a Future, eds. 
Diane Morgan and G.ary Banham (London: Palgrave, 2007), 40-68. 
10
 See John Rawls's own story about liberal democracy arising in response to the Wars of Religion.  
Consider also his discussion of liberal values as “very great values” in Political Liberalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
11
 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1996), 278. 
12
 These arguments are dependent on certain assumptions in the philosophy of action that I do not 
have time to do justice to here. 
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13
 Hence, there is no necessity in progress and “time” can travel in both directions; a tradition can 
move from maturity to immaturity just as easily as the opposite.  The distinction between mature 
and immature is probably influenced by Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
(London: Duckworth, 1988), but I have yet to seriously think through the connections between my 
use here and his work.  A similar account of “progress” within a tradition is discussed in that work.  
14
 Political liberalism has a different aim (a stable society rather than the resolution of a one-off 
conflict) so I do not wish to suggest that this is a thoroughgoing political alternative.  It is applicable 
in specific cases of conflict between traditions that are politically independent. 
15
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, at the Heidelberg Colloquium on the 9th of July, 1989, allegedly said: “The 
possibility that the other person may be right is the soul of hermeneutics.”  Reported by Jean 
Grondin in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Hermeneutics (London: Yale University, 1964), 
124. 
16
 See note 2 above. 
